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Crynodeb
Trwy eu cysylltiad â’r Sasanidiau yn ogystal â’r llwythau nomadig megis yr Hyniaid, dysgodd 
y Bysantiaid am bwysigrwydd marchoglu, ac wrth fabwysiadu’r tactegau hyn, aethant ati i 
gynnwys y cataffract yn eu lluoedd. Nod y gwaith hwn yw asesu arwyddocâd cataffractau 
a’r modd y newidiodd hyn dros bron 500 mlynedd. Trafodaf sut y defnyddiwyd yr unedau 
hyn wrth frwydro, a oeddent yn ddinistriol o safbwynt ffisegol neu seicolegol i’r gelyn a sut 
oedd y cyd-destun hanesyddol yn caniatáu iddynt gael eu defnyddio neu’n eu hatal rhag eu 
defnyddio. Mae ysgolheigion megis Haldon a Decker yn cytuno y peidiwyd â defnyddio 
cataffractau yn ystod y 6ed ganrif, a hynny o blaid marchogion ysgafnach a ddefnyddiai’r 
bwa yn brif arf, ac nad yw Cataffractau yn ailymddangos yn ychwanegiad ond yn ystod 
ailoresgyniad y dwyrain yn y 10fed ganrif. Fy nod i yw dadlau, er iddynt gael eu disodli’n 
raddol gan farchoglu mwy symudol, y’u defnyddid o hyd yn bennaf yn foderati gan mai 
hon fu’r duedd gyffredin er y Notitia Dignitatum. Y gwir amdani oedd nad oedd modd 
eu cynnal yn dilyn colli’r taleithiau dwyreiniol cyfoethog yn sgil goresgyniadau Arabaidd 
y 7fed ganrif. 
Geiriau allweddol: Byddin Bysantiwm, cataffract, 6fed–10fed ganrif
Abstract
Contact with the Sassanids as well as nomad tribes such as the Huns taught the Byzantines 
the importance of cavalry, and in adopting these kinds of tactics they implemented the 
cataphract into their forces. %e aim of this work is to assess the significance of cataphracts 
and how this changed over nearly 500 years. I shall discuss how these units were employed 
in battle, whether they were physically or psychologically devastating to the enemy and 
how the historical context allowed or prevented them to be used. Scholars such as Haldon 
and Decker agree that cataphracts went out of use during the 6th century in favour of 
lighter horsemen whose main armament was the bow, and that Cataphracts only re-appear 
as an addition during the re-conquering of the east in the 10th century. My aim is to argue 
that while they were gradually displaced in favour of more mobile cavalry, they still were 
used mostly as foderati as this had been a common trend since the Notitia Dignitatum. 
%ey were simply unsustainable followed the loss of most of the rich eastern provinces 
following the Arab conquests in 7th century. 
Key words: Byzantine army, cataphract, 6th–10th centuries
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Introduction
“Late antiquity has traditionally been characterised rather simplistically as the dawning 
of a new ’medieval’ warfare in which the armoured horseman came to dominate the 
battlefields of Europe and the Near East”.1 %is quotation summarizes a modern myth 
that has existed regarding the transitional movement during what we know today as 
the shift from late antiquity, into the period called the ‘Middle Ages’.2 %e cavalry type 
that stands out to many in this period is the cataphract, a heavily armed cavalryman 
covered from head to toe in chainmail and lamellar armour, often pointed to as an 
influence for the later the medieval knights as they were both employed as heavy 
shock cavalry.3 Historians such as Coulston have discussed cataphracts as primarily 
being used by the empires of the Near East such as the Parthians, whose cataphracts 
famously helped them to crush the Romans at the battle of Carrhae, and the Sassanid 
Persians.4 %e success of this cavalry type is often assumed to have led to its adoption 
by the Byzantine Empire.5 Popular media and scholarship has tended to assume their 
importance within the Byzantine military.6 For example, Dahmus, discussing the 
battle of Yarmuk in 636, describes how the “the principal strength of the Byzantine 
army lay within their heavy cavalry, the cataphracts, who carried a lance, broadsword, 
bow, quiver, and dagger”.7 However, in contemporary sources there is limited evidence 
of cataphracts being employed, compared to what might be expected.8 
%is article argues that the Byzantine cavalry was influenced by the cataphracts 
of earlier periods. %is counters modern scholarship that tends to dismiss their usage 
after the fifth century, rather than examining ways in which elements of the cataphract 
continued to be used by the cavalry that evolved from them, or addressing why they 
were revived in the middle of the tenth century and then almost vanished by the 
beginning of the eleventh.9 It is vital to clarify the meaning of the terms cataphract 
and clibanarii. %ey are sometimes understood as the same thing, appearing to refer 
to a class of horseman or armoured horsemen in general.10 To grasp the significance 
of cataphracts, one must investigate their origins and their roles leading up to the 
sixth century for a comparison to be made (Section 1). Over this period there were 
significant changes made to the Byzantine military, including changes in cavalry roles 
from the fifth to the sixth centuries epitomised by the adoption of the composite bow, 
the Islamic conquests and the subsequent retreat into Anatolia, and the adoption 
of the theme system and imperial Tagmata.11 Finally, the tenth century heralds the 
arrival of a new class of heavy cavalry under Nikephoros Phokas, which looks back to 
the cataphracts of old in their armament and function. A section shall be dedicated 
to each era to analyse how the cavalrymen evolved through incorporating elements of 
the ancient cataphracts (Sections 2–4).
1. Cataphract Origins 
For a complete analysis of Byzantine cataphracts it is important to understand their 
origins. By examining Greco-Roman ancient sources one may analyse the usage of 
the term cataphract and discuss the inconsistencies concerning its meaning. %e word 
cataphract comes from the Greek word ???????????, meaning to cover or enclose with 
mail.12 %e term is compared to the Roman word clibanarii, which refers to a covered 
pot in which bread would be baked – this appears to be related to the conditions of 
fighting in heavy armour in hot conditions.13 %e first record of clibanarii is from 
Alexander Severus 56.5 in which he gives a speech referring to Persian cavalry which 
many scholars have interpreted as the Roman name for a Persian cavalryman armed 
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like a cataphract.14 Ammianus Marcellinus describes them as looking like “statues 
polished by the hand of Praxiteles…” whose breastplates “fitted to the curves of their 
bodies...” so that whichever way they turned the armour allowed for their movement.15
In contrast, the first description of cataphracts in Heliodorus’ Aethiopica, describes 
the impressive force of mailed Persian cavalry covered from head to toe in mail 
made from brass and iron, with holes for him to see through, and his horse being 
armoured in the same manner.16 %ese descriptions have several similarities. Both 
are fully armoured, in scale armour. Although it is not described in Ammianus, the 
horse of the clibanarus was also heavily armoured. We know this due to the discovery 
of a depiction of a Persian clibanarus in graffiti at the Roman frontier town of Dura-
Europos in Syria.17 %erefore, it is difficult to distinguish the two terms, as Ammianus 
alternates between them. %e Notitia Dignitatum follows Ammianus in the same vein, 
a document listing seven units of cataphractarii, and seven units of clibanarii, stationed 
within the eastern half of the Roman Empire, clearly differentiating between the two 
types. It would suggest that in the 5th century Roman army the cataphractarii and the 
clibanarii were two separate units performing different roles on the battlefield; yet this 
does not necessarily mean that they were used or equipped in the manner described 
by either Ammianus or Heliodorus.18
Speidel, who bases his argument on the Notitia and tombstone at Claudiopolis 
in Bithynia,19 argues that ‘cataphract’ applies to all heavily armoured cavalry, but the 
term Clibanarii, applies to Persian and Parthian heavily armoured cavalry.20 Coulston 
argues conversely that the distinction lies in the equipment, i.e. that cataphractarii 
were less armoured than the clibanarii and that they were equipped with a lance and 
shield (not a lance and bow).21 Despite what Speidel and Coulston say, it is Eadiee’s 
theory that appears to be more credible. %is cites reliefs on the column of Marcus 
Aurelius, suggesting that the cataphractarii were heavily armed contarii, who were 
light cavalry armed with a kontos (a two handed lance). %ey would therefore provide 
a more flexible alternative to the super heavy clibanarii who lacked manoeuvrability 
and the contarii who lacked the shock power of the clibanarii.22 From historical 
sources it appears that the cataphract’s function on the battlefield was psychological 
intimidation of the enemy, rather than to physically smash through enemy infantry as 
horses refuse to charge things they perceive as solid, however their gleaming armour 
and weapons caused the “shock” according to Onasander.23 At the battle of Carrhae 
the cataphracts were used by the Parthians to rout the Roman infantry so that they 
were easier targets for the horse archers. In descriptions emphasis is always placed on 
their appearance rather than prowess in melee.24
%e lack of clarity among ancient authors when defining the term cataphract, and 
what it actually represented are directly relevant to the three periods of Byzantine 
history discussed in the next three sections. Like all forms of warfare, cavalry evolved 
due to the circumstances and enemies encountered by a nation, often simultaneously. 
%is is certainly true of the Byzantine cavalry, which borrowed from these older 
models through trial, error and experience on the battlefield. To avoid confusion on 
this matter I will use the term cataphract when referring to armoured cavalry in a 
general manner. 
2. ‘e Avar Type’: Armoured cavalry of the 6th and early 7th centuries
%e source material for the period between the Notitia Dignitatum and the work of 
Procopius, who is our primary source for the wars of Justinian, is very scarce. By the 
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time we have reached Procopius the contemporary cavalryman had changed drastically 
in function and in armament compared to those previously mentioned. Below I 
will analyse the 6th-century cavalrymen of both Procopius and the Strategikon, to 
show that the Byzantine military was one that adapted to the influx of new nomadic 
neighbours which helped to mould a new type of cavalryman but also adopt tactics 
from them.
In the opening chapter of !e Wars of Justinian, Procopius illustrates the ideal 
cavalryman of his era as wearing corselets and being able to fire arrows while riding 
on horseback.25 %is description bears little resemblance to the clibanarii described 
in Ammianus Marcellinus or the Persian cataphracts described in the Aethopica. 
%e rider’s torso is protected by his corselet made from mail, however he appears to 
have no helmet and relies on his shield to protect his face.26 His main armament is 
the compound bow, which according to Procopius could pierce through shield and 
corselet alike.27 %e compound bow had been adopted by the Byzantines along with 
the stirrups through contact with the Huns in the fifth century and then the Avars in 
the sixth.28 
%e heavy shock tactics of the cataphracts and clibanarii of the earlier centuries 
were ineffective against these nomadic peoples who favoured light, fast moving horse 
archers as exemplified in the defeat of the Sassanian Shah Peroz by the Hephalites 
who feigned retreat, leading the much heavier Sassanian cavalry into an ambush.29 
%e effectiveness of the clibanarii depended on a mass charge to break the enemy 
formation. %e lack of the manoeuvrability of the clibanarii meant that even if the 
mounted archers could not repel the charge they could retreat to a safe distance and 
wear them down without the fear of being caught as well as ambushing them in the 
flanks, etc.30 %is is probably why Procopius refers to this story during his narrative, 
in order to explain to the civilian readership why such tactics were employed by the 
Byzantines, most notably in the Wars of Justinian and in the Strategikon of Maurice.31 
In the Strategikon there are many examples of this tactical evolution as the author 
makes frequent references to both the equipment of the Byzantine cavalryman and 
the tactics used by them as “in the Avar manner…” or the “Scythian ambush” which 
is cited as a staple of Byzantine cavalry tactics up until at least the 10th century.32 A 
prime example of the Scythian ambush (luring the opponent into an ambush and 
the fleeing unit of cavalry turning around to envelope the pursuer) can be seen at the 
battle of Dara in 530 against the Persians.33
Although pitched battles were generally avoided in this period, probably due to 
the defensive position that the empire usually found itself in (maintaining its borders 
from incursions of various enemies), Dara does illuminate the effectiveness of the new 
look cavalry.34 %e battle at Dara takes place over two days. Both engagements begin 
with a skirmish between archers (mounted and on foot) in which the Byzantines on 
both occasions are more successful. %is is in part due to the Byzantine archer being 
more powerful and accurate, because of the better armament that the composite bow 
offered.35 Belisarius is able to defeat the Persian army at Dara by feigning retreat on 
his left flank, which lures the Persian cavalry past the ditch and into an ambush by 
a contingent of Byzantine horsemen hidden behind a nearby hill. %e Byzantine 
cavalry fleeing then reengage with the Persians, causing them to break, which allows 
them to surround the Persians on the other flank, before routing the rest of the 
Persian army.36 Pitched battles were a rarity for the time period, for example in the 
campaigns of re-conquest in North Africa and Italy; there were comparatively more 
small skirmishes, which involved the sallying out from besieged cities by cavalry, and 
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this was a tactic used frequently by Belisarius. Although both campaigns were heavily 
influenced by pitched battles such as Tricamarum and Taginae respectively, both were 
characterised by this skirmishing and the siege battles accompanying it, which fast 
moving cavalry excelled at.37 
While the bow from Procopius’ account and from the Strategikon itself seems to be 
the most important weapon for 6th–7th century Byzantine cavalrymen38 (it is most 
likely that the final copy of the Strategikon was composed by Heraclius or one of his 
generals39), they are more than capable of being used as the “composite cavalry” of 
the Strategikon onwards, which functioned as both archers and lancers.40 During the 
battle of Tricamarum the Byzantine cavalry led three attacks on the Vandal lines, first 
wearing them down with bow and then engaging them in a melee, causing a mass 
rout and showing that they were certainly a capable shock cavalry.41
In the description of the ideal cavalryman in the Strategikon, the author describes 
how the rider “should have hooded coats of mail reaching to their ankles, which 
can be caught up by thongs and rings, along with carrying cases, helmets with small 
plumes on top…”42 before mentioning that: 
“%e horses, especially those of the officers and the other special troops, in particu-
lar those in the front ranks of the battle line, should have protective pieces of iron 
armour about their heads and breast plates of iron or felt…”43
When referring to “the special” troops, the author is probably referring to the bucellarii 
who originally were soldiers employed by private individuals but which came to form 
a part of the Byzantine army.44 In %eophanes’ account of the battle of Nineveh, 
Heraclius’ horse is protected from spear thrusts and sword blows by its ‘cataphract’ 
and some understandably may assume that this is evidence for cataphracts in the 
Byzantine army.45 However, ‘cataphract’ is probably a reference to the armour just as 
the Taktika of Leo refers to body armour of cavalrymen as ‘Klibania’. It is insufficient 
as evidence for regular use of cataphracts.46
Rance questions the idealisation of the Byzantine mounted warrior of Procopius, 
suggesting that only the bucellarii were capable of fighting in the manner that 
Procopius describes, as they were elite professional troops maintained at the expense 
of the emperor.47 It is also recorded in the Notitia Dignitatum that the bucellarii under 
the Magister Militum in the east contains both catafractarii and clibanarii.48 It can 
therefore be theorised that these special bucellarii troops were probably the heavily 
armoured cavalry, protected by coats of mail and horse armour. %erefore, rather 
than being categorised as either the catapfractarii or clibinarii of earlier generations, 
it could be argued that they inherited useful features from both, being able to engage 
with bow and lance. Not being enclosed in armour made them more flexible when 
adapting to different enemies who employed different styles of war.
3. Byzantium on the Defence: Armoured cavalry in the 7th–9th centuries
%e Islamic conquests of the seventh century marked a turning point in the fortunes 
of the Byzantine military. %e Muslims had conquered the eastern provinces. 
Western territory was gradually lost to Lombard and Slavic invasions respectively and 
Iconoclasm would split the clergy and cause internal tensions.49 Imperial forces were 
pushed back into Anatolia, which became the base of operation as it was forced to 
deal with annual Arab and Bulgar raids into imperial territory. %e equipment and 
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tactics of the Byzantine cavalry in the seventh to ninth centuries match those of the 
sixth. However the structure of the army was tailored to deal with these incursions.
%e seventh to ninth centuries contain little original detail concerning the 
Byzantine military.50 Limited contemporary historical accounts remain, which may 
reflect the crisis the empire was in.51 When %eophanes the Confessor was writing 
(sometime after AD 812/3), the Byzantine army had been wiped out by the Bulgars 
and the Emperor Nikephoros I had been killed. %e writers of this period considered 
it a turbulent and tumultuous period.52 
%e introduction of the theme system and the imperial tagmata illustrates the 
defensive stance the empire found itself in externally and internally. %e exact date that 
the themes were created is unknown, but it is first mentioned in %eophanes at the 
beginning of the reign of Heraclius.53 Heraclius supposedly organised the Byzantine 
territory into four themes following the Persian invasion. Each theme was governed 
by a strategos who held complete civilian and military authority.54 %e purpose of the 
themes was to quickly assemble highly mobile forces which could harass and ambush 
an enemy invading force.55 %e army became something of a militia, responsible for 
providing their own equipment. %e “composite cavalry” would have been recruited 
from those who could afford the equipment.56
%e most credible source for the Byzantine deployment of heavy cavalry is in the 
Taktika, attributed to Emperor Leo VI (886–912), although his sole authorship is 
contested.57 It is difficult to assess how reliable the Taktika is in relation to the warfare 
of this period as it is a compilation of works, with many passages taken from the 
Strategikon, Onasander and Aelian, as opposed to its being a written military manual 
in the sense that the Strategikon is, so it is unclear whether some things recorded 
in it are relevant to the time period.58 An example of this is the mention of what 
appears to be the clibanarii: “%ey armed the heavy-armed cavalryman and his horse 
completely… with lamellar armour or mail or some other material”.59 %ere is no 
detail about how they should be used, only that some engaged in combat and others 
threw missiles as support for them.60 %ere is no evidence in historical accounts that 
these kinds of troops were employed, probably because warfare in this period revolved 
around the ability to quickly assemble a force that could harass a hostile incursion and 
potentially destroy it using surprise attacks.61 %e author of the Taktika even states 
that everything has been gathered so that a general can take from it what he considers 
beneficial. %erefore it is probably adapted from a previous military treatise.62
In terms of how the heavy cavalry is armed the Taktika is almost identical to the 
Strategikon with the addition of each cavalryman being armed with a double-sided 
axe with a spiked blade on the opposite side.63 %e axe signifies the increased role 
of the composite cavalryman as a shock trooper; axes are more efficient at punching 
through armour and would probably have been employed in a similar way to the 
kataphraktoi of the mid tenth century.64 It is probable that the composite cavalrymen 
from the period of Maurice were represented by the personal retainer of the strategoi 
and the imperial tagmata, a military institution which was installed by Constantine 
V following successive rebellions by the ever more politicised themes.65 %e purpose 
of the imperial tagmata was to curb the power of the themes and to provide the 
emperor with an elite body of soldiers that would remain loyal to him. It is therefore 
no surprise that they mainly consisted of old bodyguard units.66
Tactics and many of the manoeuvres in the engagements described in the histories 
support the theory that they were carried over from the Strategikon and that many 
of the military theories described therein were still relevant for the annual border 
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raiding between the Byzantines and the Arabs and Bulgars. During his campaign 
against the Bulgars, Constantine V defeats a Bulgarian host by surprising them at 
Lithosoria in 772.67 During his war with the Paulicians Basil I is able to pillage the 
enemy countryside and then ambush and destroy the Paulician counter raid with a 
much smaller force, killing their leader Karbeas in the process.68
While the Taktika suggests that the Byzantines were experimenting with the idea 
of adopting cataphracts, the fact that the emperor %eophilius was triumphant69 in 
this period following raids into Arab territory and seizing a few cities shows that 
warfare in this period was too small-scale for the deployment of the cataphract, who 
relied on flat terrain which did not break up its formation unlike the topography of 
Anatolia and Bulgaria.
4. ‘e white death of the Saracens’: Age of Reconquest and 10th century 
armoured cavalry
From the mid-tenth century onwards we begin to see military reverses in favour 
of the Byzantines, particularly the destruction of the Hamdanid emirate in Aleppo 
and the retaking of Crete under the reign of Nikephoros Phokas. We also see the 
incorporation of kataphraktoi into the Byzantine army. By examining the praecepta 
militaria along with contemporary historian Leo the Deacon who discusses in detail 
the Cilician and later campaigns of John Tzimiskes, It shall thus be discussed how 
these changes coincide with each other and how the kataphraktoi gave the Byzantines 
a new offensive unit, demonstrating that they complemented military units and 
tactics that were already established rather than replacing them.70
As with the reasoning for their absence in the previous centuries, the best reason 
for their revival can be found in the geography that the conflicts were taking place 
in. %e majority of the recorded use of the kataphraktoi is in the wars fought against 
Hamdanid Emirate based in Aleppo and their allies based in Tarsos which had been a 
constant base of operations for any Arab army wishing to penetrate Anatolia. %e area 
surrounding both Tarsos and Aleppo is considerably flat in comparison to the largely 
rugged and mountainous terrain in Anatolia, and therefore far better for employing 
kataphraktoi.71 For instance, Leo the Deacon observes how before the battle outside 
of Tarsos, Nikephoros employs his men in cutting down the reeds and destroying any 
wooded terrain.72 %e reason Leo gives is to prevent any Tarsan forces from launching 
an ambush, although it was possibly also a strategy on Nikephoros’ part to create 
space and flat terrain for his Katapraktoi to operate, which consequently are used 
to break the Tarsan forces when they sally out.73 %e Pracepta discusses a formation 
similar to that employed by Nikephoros at Tarsos with the kataphraktoi deployed 
in the vanguard supported by two flanks of composite cavalry providing supporting 
fire for the kataphraktoi and attacking any enemy units that attempt to disrupt the 
kataphraktoi assault.74 
According to the Praecepta, the kataphraktoi were employed as the main shock 
arm of the tenth century army. Employed in a wedge formation of 504 or 384 men 
(Phokas estimates Byzantine forces for this period at around 25,000 men).75 %e 
kataphraktoi were reserved for the purpose of punching through the enemy’s elite unit 
or attacking the location of the enemy general before retreating behind the Byzantine 
infantry for shelter.76 Mcgeer cites Agathias’ passage in connection with the rise of the 
kataphraktoi in the tenth century, suggesting that its purpose was to break the highly 
disciplined Daylami mercenary infantry, who served as the palace guards for emirs 
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and were notoriously difficult to rout.77 Agathias’ passage dates to the sixth century, 
so it is more likely that the change of terrain in which the fighting took place was the 
reason for the revival of cataphracts.78
Phokas also discusses counter measures should the enemy infantry close the 
distance on the Byzantines before the kataphraktoi can be deployed.79 He advises 
that the kataphraktoi strikeforce should move through gaps in the corners of the 
infantry square formation and assail the enemy flanks.80 %is tactic was employed by 
the emperor John Tzimiskes in the first stage of the battle of Dorostolon, where he 
divided the kataphraktoi into two divisions which were successful in caving the Rus’ 
flanks in on themselves.81 It is evident that the kataphraktoi were still employed to 
cause fear, as Nikephoros deploys them during the siege of Tarsos to intimidate the 
inhabitants of the town, and a passage from the Strategikon advises generals to employ 
their most physically intimidating troops in front of a city under siege.82 
%e presence of the accompanying cavalry units suggests that the kataphraktoi of 
the tenth century were still vulnerable to being disrupted by enemy counter attacks or 
attempts to stall the charge, as due to the heavy armoured nature of the kataphraktoi 
they relied on momentum. %ey are armed very similarly in terms of armour to 
the Persian clibanarii described above, but differ slightly in their weapons and the 
construction of their armour. Instead of uniformly being armed with the kontos only 
the kataphraktoi close to the rear and on the flanks of the wedge are armed in such a 
manner, whereas the horsemen located at the front are armed with maces and sabres 
which were used as shock weapons rather than lances (mainly used for thrusting).83 
%e armour was composed of supplementary pieces: the corselet which stretched 
down to their elbows and waist, arm guards, helmet and leg guards.84 %e reasoning 
for the additional pieces was that in the hot climate of the area of interest the 
kataphraktos could keep cool and add the extra armour during the march or allow 
them to be deployed as lighter cavalry giving them greater flexibility.85 Both of these 
changes to the way that the new Byzantine class of cavalry operated meant that they 
did not necessarily have to deal with issues that had caused previous users of clibanarii 
problems. In Heliodorus for example, the manner in which the Persian clibanarii were 
defeated was that their charge was stalled by a detachment of infantry sent out to 
intercept the clibanarii and break up their formation, a problem that could now be 
avoided by the presence of the escort units.86 %e other issue which the Praecepta 
attempts to eliminate is the conditioning of such a heavily armoured unit which 
would suffer from heat and exhaustion, which caused the Roman clibanarii to be 
defeated in the battle of Strasbourg.87 
Even with the addition of the kataphraktoi the Byzantines heavily relied on surprise 
attacks and raiding. Arguably the decisive engagement of the Byzantine-Hamdanid 
war was an ambush by Leo Phokas on the Hamdanid forces as they were returning 
through the mountain passes at Andrassos, resulting in most of the Hamdanid 
field army being destroyed.88 A lot of the successes of Nikephoros’ campaigns result 
from raids conducted by the prokoursatores who were sent ahead of the main army 
to burn and raise land between Tarsos and Aleppo, effectively isolating the latter.89 
Ideally a Nikephorian expeditionary force was built around the kataphraktoi, the 
composite cavalry was used to protect it from enemy attempts to stall its attack and 
the infantry who formed a solid square was used as a safe haven for retreat and to clear 
the intended battle field so that they could be deployed. However Andrassos shows 
that these successes were only possible through surprise attack and raiding, giving the 
kataphraktoi the environment they needed to function properly.
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Conclusion 
%e evidence for this period being dominated by the armoured horseman has been 
deconstructed in this essay. %e ease which the evidence often presented as reason as 
reason to believe on the reliance of armoured horsemen can be deconstructed is so 
significant that the argument cannot stand against its historical context. %e Byzantine 
army was highly reliant on the deployment of flexible cavalry, used for scouting, 
raiding, ambushing and in pitched battles such as Lithosoria and Dorostolon. While 
they did inherit many features, such as select arms and armour, from the earlier 
models of cataphracts, they operated in a way that made them far more useful. 
Cautious attitudes to war are definitely epitomised in the Strategikon which describes 
the general who commits his whole force in one attack as inviting a host of evils.90 
%is reveals that the Byzantines were more concerned about preserving their forces 
to defend multiple borders than with expansion.91 Even with the re-introduction of 
the kataphraktoi in the tenth century and a seemingly more aggressive stance, they 
could only be effective on flat terrain which made them particularly situational. It is 
therefore no surprise that they gradually disappeared as they were replaced by foreign 
mercenary contingents such as Normans and Pechenegs in the eleventh century.92 
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